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Private Vehicle Ownership in Provincial China
by Patrick McCarthy and Junda Wang
Private vehicle ownership has rapidly grown with China’s economic development and increasing 
incomes. This paper analyzes China’s provincial demands for private vehicles during the post-
opening period 2000 – 2012. Based on estimates from pooled, fi xed effects and Hausman-Taylor 
models, private vehicle ownership during this period grew at an average annual rate of over 20%, 
all else constant. The study focuses on the roles of economic, spatial, investment and regulatory 
factors in shaping private vehicle demands. The study fi nds that increases in GDP per capita and 
vehicle use cost reinforce and constrain, respectively, the strong trend toward increased ownership. 
And absent changes in population density, higher percentages of the population in urban areas 
increase the demand for private vehicles. But increasing population density provides stronger 
incentives for reducing vehicle demands. Municipal restrictions aimed at reducing the congestion 
and environmental effects of vehicle ownership and use are effective in reducing provincial demands. 
A separate analysis of provinces that are at least 60% urbanized identifi es important differences. 
Vehicle demands are income elastic and infrastructure investments have stronger effects in the most 
urbanized provinces than in less urbanized provinces.   
INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of China’s automobile industry, continuous improvements in road 
infrastructure, and rising disposable incomes, China entered the era of increased private vehicle 
consumption in 1997. During the period of China’s “planned economy” (1953-1980), its vehicle 
sector focused on the production of vehicles for fi rms, government agencies, and social groups. 
Subsequent to the opening in 1997, the vehicle sector expanded its focus toward private vehicle 
consumption. In 1997, the civilian (i.e., non-government) vehicle ownership was 12 million and 
private vehicle ownership was 3.6 million (29%). A short 15 years later, in 2012, civilian vehicle 
ownership was 109 million and private vehicle ownership was 88 million, accounting for 81% of 
civilian vehicles. These increases in civilian and private vehicle ownership represent a staggering 
808% and 2,340% increase, respectively, and a substantial change in the structure of China’s vehicle 
industry. China continues to have one of the highest annual motorization growth rates in the world 
(Figure 1). The total number of private vehicles in the country increased from 9.67 million in 2002 
to 123.39 million in 2014. The motorization rate rose from 7.54 vehicles per 1,000 persons to 90.21 
vehicles per 1,000 persons in the same time period. Whereas some analysts had predicted that 
China’s motorization rate would grow to 54 vehicles per 1,000 by 2020, an average increase of 7.3% 
annually (Energy Information Administration 2000), Figure 1 indicates that China`s motorization 
rate far exceeded those predictions well before 2020.
For the 2002-2014 period, Table 1 reports private vehicle ownership in total and per 1,000 
persons, GDP per capita (Gu et al. 2010), and total and urban population. During this 13-year period, 
private vehicle ownership grew at an annual rate of 21.6%, 65% higher than the large increase in 
per capita GDP and nearly six times higher than annual growth in urban population. Further, due to 
lower birth rates that are often attributed to the overall level of socioeconomic development and to 
family planning programs in the 1970s and 1980s, including the government’s well-known one-child 
policy, China’s population growth remained small during this period, with an annual 0.48% increase 
per year. China’s strong vehicle growth has also given rise to well-documented negative effects of 
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private vehicle ownership: signifi cantly worsening traffi c congestion, air pollution and associated 
health effects, vehicle-related fatalities and injuries, and greater dependence on oil imports (Ministry 
of Environmental Protection 2012). As a highly populated developing country and with increasing 
urbanization, road congestion and poor air quality are common phenomena in China’s megacities 
(e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen). Shenzhen, for example, has the highest vehicle 
density in China at nearly 500 vehicles per square kilometer. Motor vehicles in China’s major cities 
are responsible for 50% to 60% of air pollution, emitting 46.12 million tons of pollutants in 2012 
(National Bureau of Statistics China (http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/)). Globally, seven of the 
top 20 cities with the most serious air pollution are in China (Zhang and Crooks 2012). China 
recognizes the importance of this. In a report on key government initiatives for 2017, the seventh 
initiative focuses on environmental protection. Among its strategies for improving air quality is a 
signifi cant reduction in older high polluting vehicles, retrofi tting pollution abatement technologies 
on vehicles, and encouraging the use of clean energy vehicles (Keqiang 2017). Consistent with 
this, a number of larger and more congested cities in China have adopted various policies to reduce 
these negative externalities, including restrictions on vehicle ownership and use and, more recently, 
congestion pricing strategies. 
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2002 9.69 9,419.94 1,284.53 502.12 7.54
2003 12.19 10,567.81 1,292.27 523.76 9.43
2004 14.82 12,363.79 1,299.88 542.83 11.4
2005 18.48 14,217.00 1,307.56 562.12 14.13
2006 23.33 16,558.38 1,314.48 582.88 17.75
2007 28.76 20,284.68 1,321.29 606.33 21.77
2008 35.01 23,851.43 1,328.02 624.03 26.37
2009 45.75 25,899.53 1,334.50 645.12 34.28
2010 59.39 30,494.44 1,340.91 669.78 44.29
2011 73.27 35,931.53 1,347.35 690.79 54.38
2012 88.39 39,446.62 1,354.04 711.82 65.28
2013 105.02 43,213.80 1,360.72 731.11 77.18
2014 123.39 46,490.77 1,367.82 749.16 90.21
Annual
Growth Rate
21.62 13.07 0.48 3.13 21.04
Source: Authors' calculations. China Statistical Yearbook 2014 (National Bureau of Statistics of P.R. China, 2014).
The research reported in this paper focuses on provincial demands for private vehicles from 
2000 to 2012. The paper’s objectives are to identify those factors that are important determinants 
of private vehicle consumption in China’s provinces and to explore how private vehicle ownership 
varies across provinces.
Relevant Literature 
Refl ecting the importance of motor vehicles and motor vehicle travel to a nation’s economy, and 
mobility and a population’s quality of life, there is an extensive literature on the demand for vehicles 
and a number of excellent studies that survey the state of knowledge on vehicle demands, including 
DeJong et al. (2004) and Xu (2011). Focusing on aggregate private vehicle demand across China’s 
provinces, Table 2 reports the representative literature on aggregate vehicle demands in low income 
or developing countries. As is true for research on developed countries, the studies in Table 2 refl ect 
two related aspects of car or vehicle ownership: 1) long-term forecasts that relate income growth to 
vehicle ownership, and that typically estimate ownership saturation at which point further increases 
in income have no or very little impact on ownership; and 2) analyses that focus on a broader set of 
determinants, including policy relevant factors.
Aggregate Saturation Models. When developing forecasts and modeling saturation, studies often 
adopt quasi-logistic and Gompertz growth models.1 These are probability models that generally 
include vehicle ownership saturation over time (as a function of gross domestic product or other 
measure of income). In these frameworks, vehicle ownership increases slowly at low GDP per 
94
Private Vehicle Ownership in Provincial China
capita, then rises more sharply, reaches an infl ection point after which vehicle ownership rises more 
slowly. Tanner (1958) was fi rst to construct and estimate an aggregate logistic model that provided 
insights on the behavior of vehicle ownership rates, marginal growth and a saturation level.
Dargay and Gatey (1999) analyzed data for 26 countries from 1960 to 1992 using Gompertz 
growth models with a dynamic specifi cation in order to estimate short-run and long-run income 
elasticities of car and vehicle ownership. The estimated income elasticities range from 2.0+/- for 
some low-income and middle-income levels, down to zero, as ownership saturation nears for the 
highest income levels. Based on 36 countries from 1960 – 2000, Wang (2005) adopts Gompertz 
growth models and fi nds a strong relationship between motorization and per capita GDP. The study 
concludes that with a growth rate of per capita GDP in the 3%-7% range, the infl ection point will 
occur between 2015 and 2042 and total vehicle ownership in China could reach nearly 260 million 
vehicles. Bouachera and Mazraati (2007) uses three functional forms (Gompertz, logistic and quasi-
logistic) to characterize the S-curve shape of car stock evolution in India. Assuming a saturation 
level of 0.85, the study predicts car ownership levels, accounting for the growth of per-capita income 
and per-capita road density. From the study, India’s vehicle stock is expected to be four times larger 
in 2015 than in 2002, increasing to nearly 50 million cars.
Even though vehicle ownership in developed countries is expected to increase at a declining 
rate with per-capita income growth and ultimately reach a saturation level, many studies` estimates 
do not predict real observed ownership levels well. Ingram and Liu (1999) note that there is little 
direct evidence that saturation levels are stationary or that they have a straightforward behavioral 
interpretation. And Button, Ngoe, and Hine (1993) conclude that the saturation level is a technical 
model feature that improves the quality of the forecasts generated. The study also notes that different 
countries or regions will have different levels of saturation with the growth of the economy. 
Policy-Oriented Aggregate Demand Models. In Ingram and Liu’s (1999) study of motorization at 
the national and urban levels, economic variables are important determinants, although the income 
effects at the urban level are somewhat weaker. Huang, Cao, and Li (2012) explore spatial variations 
of urban private car ownership in 235 Chinese cities from 1990 to 2009. The study fi nds that the 
extent of urbanization has a positive effect on private car ownership in general but a negative in the 
largest areas, metropolises, and mega-cities. The study also fi nds that the availability of substitutes, 
public transportation, and taxis limits the growth of private cars in Chinese cities to some but not to 
a large degree. 
Chin and Smith (1997) use time series data from 1968 to 1989 in Singapore to analyze the 
impact of Singapore’s Vehicle Quota Scheme, fi nding that imposing a quota is an effective policy 
to limit the number of private vehicles. The study concludes that vehicle intervention policies that 
target ownership and use are complementary. In a study on fuel consumption, Hao, Wang and 
Ouyang (2011) analyze the vehicle limitation policies of Beijing, which targets vehicle use, and 
Shanghai, whose policy focuses on vehicle ownership. The study fi nds that both policies reduce 
fuel consumption but Shanghai’s policy has larger and longer lasting effects, suggesting that the 
most effective policies are those aimed at vehicle ownership. And in a related study, Zhou and Shu 
(2014) employ fi nancial and sales data in China from 1996 to 2011 to examine the effect on traffi c 
by using odd/even license plate numbers to restrict vehicle use. The study fi nds that this control had 
a negative impact on private car ownership.
Wu, Zhao, and Zhang (2016) estimate random and fi xed effects models on a panel data of 
provincial capitals in China from 2001 – 2011. The authors fi nd that, in addition to income, the extent 
of highway mileage and the quality of roads (i.e., paved) increased car ownership. In addition, the 
study fi nds that the number of public transit vehicles per rider, a measure of public transit comfort, 
signifi cantly reduces car ownership.
The present study adds to this literature, developing and estimating panel data models of private 
vehicle ownership in China’s provinces. The unit of analysis is a province-year comprising China’s 
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Table 2: Aggregate Models of Vehicle Ownership*
Year Author(s) Methodology Data Findings
1993 Button, J., Ngoe, 









Saturation level is seen as a technical aid to 
improve the quality of forecasts. Given data 
limitations and the considerable distance of 
most low income countries from the saturation 
estimates postulated for industrialized 
countries, a short-term maximum level of car 
ownership is adopted.
1997 Chin, A. and
Smith, P.
OLS Singapore, 1968–1989 Singapore's Vehicle Quota Scheme is an 
effective way to regulate the number of private 
automobiles. Policies regulating ownership 
and usage are complementary.
1999 Ingram, G. and 
Liu, Z.
OLS 50 countries and 35 
urban areas in 1970, 
1980, and 1990
Income growth is the primary determinant of 
car ownership at the national and urban levels. 
Income elasticity is constant (or falling) over 
the range of income levels in the study.






Strong relationship between income and 
vehicle ownership growth. Lower income 
countries estimated to have income elasticity 
around 2.0 and China's growth will be at a 
high level.
2005 Wang, Y. Gompertz 
model
36 countries, some 
1960–2000, some 
1978–1992
Assuming 3%–7% annual per capita GDP 
growth, the infl ection point will occur between 
2015 and 2042. Total vehicle ownership in 
china would reach  nearly 260 million 
vehicles.






7 Asian countries, 
1971–2002
India's car stock expected to be 50 million 
cars, just under four times the level in 2002. 
Barring signifi cant technological innovations, 
motor vehicles and the transportation sector in 
general will rely heavily on fossil fuels.






Vehicle consumption differs among eastern, 
central, and western regions in China. Road 
density has a signifi cant effect on vehicle 
consumption in the three regions.





Beijing and Shanghai Beijing's policy limiting vehicle use had 
immediate but relatively small effect on fuel 
consumption; Shanghai's policy limiting 
ownership had larger and longer term effects.
2012 Huang, X., Cao, 
X., and Li. T.
OLS 235 cities in China, 
1990–2009
The extent of urbanization has a strong 
positive effect on private car ownership in 
general but a negative effect in metropolises 
and mega-cities. public transportation and 
taxis inhibit the number of private cars to a 
small degree.
2014 Zhou, M. and
Shu, W.
OLS Financial and sales 
data in China, 
1996–2011; 31 
provinces in 2012
New government policies, such as the traffi c 
control via odd and even license numbers and 
total investment in fi xed assets, have a 
negative impact on private car ownership.




32 Provincial capital 
cities, 2001–2011
Gross regional product per capita (large and 
medium cities) and average age (smaller 
cities) positively related to car ownership, as 
was paved roads and highway mileage. A 
measure of public transit comfort reduced car 
ownership.
* OLS is ordinary least squares.
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31 provinces during the 13-year period 2000 – 2012. Similar to other studies, this analysis identifi es 
the effects of income and fuel cost on private vehicle ownership and the impact that highway and 
transit infrastructure investments have on private vehicle ownership. In addition, the analysis 
explores the extent to which private vehicle ownership in China differs from ownership patterns 
in the eight most highly urbanized provinces. And the study identifi es the impact of two specifi c 
vehicle restraint policies: Beijing’s municipal policy that restricts vehicle use versus Shanghai’s 
municipal policy that restricts private vehicle ownership.
Hypotheses
To motivate the empirical analysis, consider China’s provincial demand for private vehicles at time 


















 is price of private vehicle use in province j, P
zj
 is the price of all other consumption 
in province j, Ma
 j,t
 is aggregate income of province j in year t and ϕa
,jt
 refl ects aggregate preferences 
for private transportation in province j and year t.
Since public transit is a primary competing transportation mode to the private vehicle, the price 
of public transit c
PTj,t
 is assumed to capture the price effects of all other relevant goods P
jz,t
 in the 
model.
In this framework, the price of transportation in general includes out-of-pocket monetary 
cost (e.g., fuel costs, tolls, transit fare) and the opportunity cost of the time spent traveling, which is 














where k represents private vehicle or public transit, , c
ik,t
 is the money cost and t
ik,t
 is the time cost 
of travel on mode k in province j at time t, which depends on the value of time (vot). Further, the 
existing infrastructure (inf
jk,t
), the province’s spatial development and confi guration, and vehicle 
restriction policies are conditioning factors that affect the monetary and time cost of travel on mode 
k. In China, these are of particular importance because investments on highway infrastructure 
and urban development have occurred at a rapid pace. In addition, seven provinces have imposed 
restrictions on vehicle use or vehicle ownership. 
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This framework motivates four sets of testable hypotheses related to the effects of economic factors, 
infrastructure, spatial form, and regulation on private vehicle ownership.
Hypothesis 1 – Economic Environment 
• 1a. Per-capita GDP: Holding all else constant, an increase in provincial per-capita income 
increases the demand for vehicle ownership.
• 1b. Price of vehicle and vehicle use cost: Holding all else constant, an increase in the price of 
private vehicle ownership and cost of vehicle use reduces the demand for private vehicles.
• 1c. Public transit fare: This is a substitute for private vehicles, which implies that an increase 
in public transit fares increases the demand for private vehicles.
• 1d. Average wage: Through its effect on the value of time, increasing wages increase the 
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generalized (time and money) cost of travel. All else being constant, this increases the demand 
for modes that offer faster travel, the private vehicle.2
Hypothesis 2 – Infrastructure Investment
• 2a. Real Investments on roads and bridges: Holding all else constant, an increase in the supply 
and quality of infrastructure for private transportation reduces the cost of traveling by private 
vehicle and increases the demand for private vehicles.
• 2b. Real Investments on public transit: Holding all else constant, an increase in public transit 
infrastructure reduces the overall cost of taking public transit, increasing the demand for public 
transit and reducing the demand for private vehicles.
• 2c. Road density: Holding all else constant, an increase in the number of highway kilometers 
per square mile increases capacity for transportation, reduces time costs, and stimulates the 
demand for private vehicles. 
Hypothesis 3 – Spatial Environment
• 3a. Population density: Increases in population density (persons per square kilometer) reduce 
travel speeds, increasing travel times and the time cost of highway travel. All else being 
constant, this reduces the demand for private vehicles.3 
• 3b. Urbanization level: Urbanization is a broader concept than population density and typically 
refl ects areas with higher population densities and built environments. In contrast to rural 
areas, urban areas are typically more prosperous economically, have greater accessibility to 
resources, and benefi t from various agglomeration economies. Holding constant economic 
factors, infrastructure, and population density, higher urbanization through larger built 
urban environments increases average distances traveled, which argues for increased vehicle 
ownership.  
Hypothesis 4 – Regulatory Environment
• 4a. Vehicle limitations: Policies that restrict vehicle ownership and use are negatively associated 
with private vehicle ownership. Holding all else constant, vehicle limitations increase the 
generalized cost of private vehicles (e.g. having to make other arrangements, inconvenience), 
which reduces the demand for private vehicles.
Data 
Our empirical analysis uses data from a panel of 31 provinces in China for the period 2000 – 2012. 
The main data sources are the National Bureau of Statistics of the People`s Republic of China (NBS) 
and EPS China Data (EPS).4 Table 3 defi nes the variables used in analysis. There were several 
problems encountered in collecting the data. Urban populations for several provinces are missing in 
certain years. For these provinces we assume that urban population grew at the same rate as in the 
previous year. Also, data are not available for vehicle use cost so we use the consumer price index 
(CPI) for transportation as a proxy.5 All price and cost variables are converted to real or constant 
yuan with 2000 as the base year.
Limitations on vehicle purchasing and use refl ect three types of limited quotas: a lottery for 
license plates, bidding for plates, and odd and even number rules on license plates. In order to ac-
count for these limitations on purchasing and using vehicles, we created a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a municipality in the province adopted any of these restrictions and 0 if no restrictions 
were adopted.6
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Table 3: Variable Defi nitionsa
Private Vehicle Ownership Per Capita Provincial per capita private vehicle ownership (vehicles/person)
Independent Variables Defi nition
Economic environment
GDP Per Capita Provincial per capita GDP
Vehicle Price Provincial vehicle purchase taxes per vehicle divided by the tax rate
Wage Rate Provincial average hourly wage
Vehicle Use Cost Index Provincial Transportation Consumer Price Index
Infrastructure
Highway Investments Per Capita Provincial real per capita investment on roads and bridges (100 million 
yuan)
Public Transit Investments Per Capita Provincial real per capita investment on public transit (100 million yuan)
Road Density provincial highway mileage, divided by the province's area (km/km2)
Spatial Concentration
Population density Provincial population divided by the province's area (persons/km2)
Percent Urban Provincial urban resident divided by the province population
Regulatory environment
Vehicle Limitation Limitation on vehicle ownership and use adopted by a province
Other
Time trend Year of observation
aAll monetary values are in constant 2000 yuan. Base year for the transportation price index is 2000 and the index includes 
fuels and parts, intercity traffi c fare, public transportation, fees for vehicles use and maintenance, and transportation facilities. 
The wage rate assumes working eight hours per day, 250 days of the year.
Descriptive Statistics. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The fi rst line of Table 
4 indicates that over the sample period there were 0.026 vehicles per 1,000 persons, ranging from a 
minimum of 0.001 to 0.196. On average, 45% of the population are in urban areas with an average 
population density of 402 persons per square kilometer. GDP per capita is 9,471 yuan and average 
hourly wage is equal to 10 yuan. Municipalities in 4% of the provinces have vehicle restrictions 
and per-capita spending on highways and bridges that is twice the spending on public transporta-
tion. Across time and across provinces, the variation in vehicle consumption is similar, whereas the 
standard deviations across provinces tend to be higher, refl ecting greater cross-section heterogeneity 
than temporal heterogeneity. There is much greater variation in GDP per capita across provinces 
than across time (5,525 yuan versus 849 yuan). This is also true for population density. The sample 
mean is 402 persons per square kilometer with a standard deviation of 572.2 persons per square 
kilometer. This high variation refl ects the large heterogeneity across provinces (575 persons/km2) 
in contrast to the temporal variation (27 persons/km2). An exception is the wage rate, which var-
ied more over time (4.0 yuan/hour) than across provinces (3.2 yuan/hour). Average highway road 
density, highway investments per capita, and public transit investment per capita each varied more 
across provinces than over time. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statisticsa
Group Variable # Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Full Sample Private Vehicle Consumption per 1,000 persons 403 0.026 0.03 0.001 0.196
Real Public Transport Spending per Capita (100 
million Yuan)
0.008 0.02 0 0.195
Real Highway/Bridge Spending per Capita (100 
million Yuan)
0.023 0.03 0 0.254
Vehicle Restriction (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.045 0.21 0 1
Percent Urban 0.450 0.15 0.139 0.893
Road Kilometrage (km/km squared) 0.595 0.43 0.018 1.984
Provincial Wage (Yuan/hour) 10.284 5.16 3.451 34.1
Vehicle Use Cost Index (2000 base) 108.162 10.4 87.8 141.4
Population Density (persons per km-squared) 402.417 572.2 2.1 3777.8
Provincial GDP per Capita (Yuan) 9,471.70 5535.4 2743.9 30047.0
Provinces Private Vehicle Consumption per 1,000 persons 31 0.026 0.02 0.01 0.115
Real Public Transport Spending per Capita (100 
million Yuan)
0.008 0.02 0 0.087
Real Highway/Bridge Spending per Capita (100 
million Yuan)
0.023 0.02 0.005 0.087
Vehicle Restriction (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.045 0.18 0 1
Percent Urban 0.450 0.12 0.268 0.817
Road Kilometrage (km/km squared) 0.595 0.35 0.038 1.471
Provincial Wage (Yuan/hour) 10.284 3.23 7.966 19.892
Vehicle Use Cost Index (2000 base) 108.162 7.3 92.6 122.9
Population Density (persons per km-squared) 402.417 575.0 2.3 3161.2
Provincial GDP per Capita (Yuan) 9,471.70 5525.7 3622.0 27213.2
Years Private Vehicle Consumption per 1,000 persons 13 0.026 0.02 0.006 0.067
Real Public Transport Spending per Capita (100 
million Yuan)
0.008 0.01 0.002 0.016
Real Highway/Bridge Spending per Capita (100 
million Yuan)
0.023 0.01 0.002 0.044
Vehicle Restriction (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.045 0.03 0.032 0.129
Percent Urban 0.450 0.06 0.375 0.534
Road kilometrage (km/km-squared) 0.595 0.22 0.308 0.854
Provincial Wage (Yuan/hour) 10.284 4.01 4.96 17.029
Vehicle Use Cost Index (2000 base) 108.162 6.62 100.0 119.5
Population Density (persons per km-squared) 402.417 27.4 366.1 445.8
Provincial GDP per Capita (Yuan) 9,471.70 849.4 8427.3 10811.9
aAll monetary values are in constant 2000 yuan. Base year for the transportation price index is 2000 and the index includes 
fuels and parts, intercity traffi c fare, public transportation, fees for vehicles use and maintenance, and transportation facilities. 
The wage rate assumes working eight hours per day, 250 days of the year.
Urbanization Groups. To explore the characteristics of provinces by the extent of urbanization, 
we categorize the provinces into the highest urbanization (> 60% urban) and lower urbanization
(< 60%) groups.
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the sample and group means. Provinces in the 
highest urbanization group have higher per-capita private vehicle ownership, per-capita GDP, and 
investments in roads, bridges, and public transit. Road density in the most urbanized provinces is 
100
Private Vehicle Ownership in Provincial China
nearly twice that in the remaining provinces. Population density in the highest urbanized provinces, 
on the other hand, is four times greater than in the 23 less urbanized provinces, 1,002 versus 227. 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin have the highest per-capita incomes (25,089, 27,213, and 18,126, 
respectively). These three provinces also have the highest average per-capita highway and public 
transport investments. Shanghai averages the highest population density at 3,161 persons/km2, 
nearly triple that of Beijing and Tianjin due to its much smaller land area (6,341 km2 versus 16,800 
km2 and 11,305 km2 for Beijing and Tianjin). Tibet has the lowest average population density (2.31). 
On average, the highest urbanized provinces are 50% more urbanized (60% versus 40%) than the 
other provinces. 
With the rapid development of China’s economy, private vehicle ownership broke through 100 
million vehicles in 2013 for the fi rst time. Yet the variance in private vehicle ownership is large, 
refl ecting the different rates of economic development and some unique individual characteristics 
of each province.
Seven cities have adopted limitation policies on purchasing and using vehicles, six of which 
are in the highest urbanized group. Among the lower urbanized provinces, Guiyang in Guizhou 
province also adopted a limitation policy. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Urbanization Groups
Groups Provinces
Highest urbanization (≥ 
0.60%)
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Fujian
Remaining Provinces (< 
0.60%)
Jilin, Shandong, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Chongqing, Heilongjiang, Hubei, 
Hainan, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Hunan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hebei, 








Private Vehicle Ownership per 1000 persons 
(vehicles)
0.026 0.045 0.021
GDP per Capita (yuan) 9471.7 17228.1 7209.4
Wage Rate (yuan/hour) 10.284 14.011 9.197
Vehicle Use Cost Index (2000 base) 108.2 103.8 109.4
Highway Investment per Capita (100 million yuan) 0.023 0.045 0.017
Public Transit Investment per Capita (100 million) 0.008 0.031 0.002
Road Density (km/km2) 0.595 0.941 0.494
Percent Urban 0.450 0.607 0.404
Population Density (persons/km2) 402.4 1002.7 227.3
Vehicle Restriction (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.045 0.176 0.006
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/NBS).eps net database
(http://www.epschinadata.com/).
EMPIRICAL MODEL  
Table 6 reports the results of four double-log regression models: pooled OLS [column (a)], fi xed 
effects [column (b)] and two fi xed effects models with instrumental variables [columns (c) and (d)]. 
Preliminary analyses found that a double-log specifi cation provided the best model fi t. In addition, 
including a proxy for vehicle price (see endnote 5) consistently led to inferior fi ts and sign reversals 
and was ultimately dropped from fi nal model specifi cations.  
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Pooled Model. Column (a) reports the OLS results on pooled data that do not account for cross 
section or separate time effects, but the coeffi cient standard errors are heteroskedastic/autocorrelation 
consistent. The model explains 88.9% of the variation in private vehicle ownership and the variables 
generally have their expected signs. The positive time trend indicates that, during the sample period, 
provincial private vehicle ownership annually increased 14%, all else being constant. The role 
of the economic environment is consistent with expectations. A 1% increase in per-capita GDP 
increases private vehicle demand by 0.89%.  And a 1% increase in the wage rate increases demand 
for vehicles, consistent with the value-of-time hypothesis that higher wages raise the opportunity 
cost of time. Although having the expected sign, vehicle use cost is not signifi cant at any reasonable 
level of signifi cance. 
The infrastructure results are mixed. An increase (decrease) in road kilometers per square 
mile (real investments in public transportation) increases (decreases) private vehicle ownership, 
as expected, but the results for road density are not statistically signifi cant. At the same time, real 
investments in highways decrease private vehicle ownership, contrary to expectations.
The spatial variables also have their expected signs but, similar to vehicle use cost, are not 
reliably estimated. In contrast, the regulatory policies that limit vehicle ownership or use are 
effective in reducing vehicle demands.
The OLS results in Table 6 provide a reasonable fi t with parameter estimates whose signs 
generally conform to the underlying hypotheses. However, concerns with cross section heterogeneity 
and endogeneity, if present and not addressed, bias the OLS estimates reported in Column (a) and 
lead to incorrect inferences.
Fixed and Random Effects Models. Column (b) in Table 6 reports the results when re-estimating 
the model with cross-section fi xed effects. There are two specifi cation issues addressed in Column 
(b). First, the fi xed effects model rejects at well below the .01 level the pooled model, that is, the null 
hypothesis that the fi xed effects are jointly 0. Second, in controlling for cross-section heterogeneity, 
a common alternative specifi cation is the random effects model. The Hausman test statistic for the 
random effects model rejects at the .01 level the random effects model in favor of the fi xed effects 
specifi cation.7
The results reported in Column (b) of Table 6 differ from those in Column (a) in a number of 
signifi cant ways. First, the cross-section fi xed effects model increases the adjusted R2 from 0.889 
to 0.983. Second, the time trend increases signifi cantly, indicating that the annual growth in vehicle 
consumption per 1,000 persons was 23.0% during the sample period in comparison with 14.0% 
in the pooled model. In addition, real infrastructure spending on public transportation is no longer 
signifi cant, although the variable maintains a negative sign.
Per-capita GDP continues to have a positive and signifi cant effect on vehicle ownership (with a 
lower point estimate) and the index for vehicle use cost continues to reduce vehicle ownership, all 
else being constant. But the negative impact on ownership of vehicle use cost is now signifi cant at a 
0.15 level (two-tail test), which refl ects a larger coeffi cient (in absolute value) and a more precisely 
estimated coeffi cient. Related, the vehicle ownership and use limitation policies are again negative 
and signifi cant, but the magnitude of the effect has decreased (in absolute value) from -0.67 to -0.18.
Also in contrast to the OLS results, the spatial environment in Column (b) has its expected 
impact on vehicle ownership. A percentage point increase in the urbanization rate, all else being 
constant, increases vehicle demand 0.45%, whereas a 1% increase in population density, all else 
being constant, decreases demand 1.6%.
Omitted Variables and Endogeneity. In aggregate models, endogeneity bias and inconsistent 
estimates often occur by including variables that are simultaneously determined with the dependent 
variable or by excluding (e.g., due to data unavailability) relevant variables. When the omitted 
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Table 6: Panel Data Estimation Resultsa
Dependent Variable - Private Vehicle Ownership Per 1,000 Persons










Explanatory Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
Economic Environment
GDP Per Capita 0.899*** 0.179 0.638** 0.248 0.722*** 0.278 0.996*** 0.168
Wage Rate 0.681*** 0.212 -0.033 0.179 0.075 0.195 0.034 0.115
Vehicle Use Cost Index -0.404 0.652 -0.797 0.545 -1.028** 0.492 -1.041*** 0.223
Infrastructure
Highway Investments -0.049 0.030 -0.015 0.015 0.015 0.021 0.027 0.017
Public Transit Investments -0.055** 0.023 -0.006 0.010 -0.012 0.009 -0.007 0.007
Road Density 0.036 0.135 -0.033 0.046 0.032 0.081 0.057 0.049
Spatial Concentration
Percent Urban 0.668 0.450 0.458*** 0.167 0.384** 0.172 0.349*** 0.112
Population Density -0.076 0.092 -1.624*** 0.352 -1.306*** 0.391 -0.662*** 0.170
Regulatory Environment
Vehicle Limitation -0.671** 0.275 -0.184*** 0.048 -0.300** 0.126 -0.350*** 0.095
Other
Time Trend 0.138*** 0.031 0.230*** 0.019 – – – –
Constant -296.3*** 60.0 -456.1*** 34.7 3.743 3.376 -6.134*** 2.238
Cross Section Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes











Hausman Test (p-value) – 0.008 <0.0001 0.864
N 403 403 372 372
MSE 0.104 0.0175 0.0157 0.0150
Adjusted R2 0.889 0.983 0.985 0.976
a p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With the exception of Percent Urban, Vehicle Limitation, Time Trend, and Constant, all variables are in 
logarithmic form. For the IV models, all variables except the Constant, Wage Rate, Population Density, Urban and Vehicle Limitation are 
lagged one period. The instrument for Vehicle Limitation is the predicted value of Vehicle Limitation from a binary probit model on a 
constant term, time trend, and one-period lagged values of the logarithms of GDP Per Capita, Wage Rate, Public Transit Investment, Road 
Density, Percent Urban, and Population Density. The data analysis for this paper was generated using SAS/ETS software, Version 9.r of the 
SAS System for Windows. Copyright © 2002–2012 SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC< USA.
* For the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimates, a separate adjustment for heteroskedasticity is not necessary since the model estimates cross 
section variance components. The errors are not robust to serial correlation.
variables are correlated with included explanatory variables, the parameter estimates are not 
consistent, where the direction of the bias depends on the correlation between the excluded and 
included variables.8 
Of particular concern in this analysis are included endogenous variables that lead to inconsistent 
estimates. Vehicle ownership depends on highway and bridge infrastructure, but real infrastructure 
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spending also depends on the extent of vehicle ownership and use. Higher vehicle ownership is 
expected to increase real spending on highways and bridges to accommodate the greater number 
of vehicles. Similarly, per-capita GDP, as a proxy for income, is potentially endogenous. While 
economic growth and development increase GDP per capita and generate more demands for private 
vehicles, the growth in private vehicles facilitates higher levels of production, productivity, and 
GDP growth.
To address these endogeneity concerns, we estimate models using instrumental variables (IV). 
Traditionally, an instrumental variable is one that is correlated with independent variable(s) and 
uncorrelated with the error term. For this analysis, we adopted two approaches. First, we include 
lagged values of potentially endogenous variables as instrumental variables in the model. Logically, 
lagged variables are predetermined and, as such, can serve as instrumental variables. Second, we 
searched for potential instrumental variables outside of those in the model.9 
Column (c) of Table 6 reports the results of a two-way fi xed effects models in which the 
lagged values instrument for variables are of primary concern – GDP per capita, vehicle use cost, 
infrastructure spending on highways/bridges and public transportation, and road density. Standard 
errors are heteroskedastic/autocorrelation consistent and also account for clustering effects.
Notwithstanding that the IV – Lagged results reported in Column (c) of Table 6 have 31 fewer 
observations due to lagging one period, the results are generally consistent with the fi xed effects 
model in Column (b). The adjusted R2 in the IV – Lagged model is a bit higher (0.985) and the 
mean squared error (MSE) is lower (0.015). Rather than a time trend, this model estimates separate 
time effects (not reported), which imply a 20.7% average annual growth in vehicle consumption 
per 1,000 persons, similar to the 23.7% estimate of the annual trend in Column (b). A Hausman test 
again rejects a random effects in favor of a fi xed effects specifi cation.
GDP per capita in Column (c) has a similar impact on vehicle consumption as in Column (b) but 
the effect of vehicle use cost increases (in absolute value) by about a third, from -0.797 to -1.028. 
The infrastructure variables have signs that are consistent with expectations and, in this case, real 
spending on public transportation is signifi cant at a 0.20 level (two-tail test). The spatial variables in 
IV-Lagged are robust to their values in the fi xed effects model. In contrast, the coeffi cient for vehicle 
limitation has increased (in absolute value), indicating that the presence of restrictions on vehicle 
ownership/use reduces vehicle demands per 1,000 persons 30%. 
Hausman-Taylor IV Model. Column (d) in Table 6 reports estimates from a Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) specifi cation of the model. This approach has two attractive features for the current problem. 
First, the Hausman-Taylor model is an instrumental variables regression in which some of the 
model’s variables are assumed to be correlated with the individual effects but uncorrelated with 
the observation errors. Second, the approach essentially combines elements of a fi xed-effects IV 
regression with a one-way random effects specifi cation. For this analysis, the assumption is that 
real spending on highways and bridges, real spending on public transportation, and road density are 
correlated with the individual effects but uncorrelated with the observation error terms. Instrumental 
variables are based on the model’s other variables, which include GDP per capita, vehicle use cost, 
wage rate, percent urban, and population density.10 
Goodness of fi t statistics from the Hausman-Taylor specifi cation in Column (d) are similar to 
those for the IV-Lagged model. The adjusted R2 is slightly smaller (0.976 vs. 0.985) but the mean-
squared error is smaller (0.0150 vs. 0.0157). A p-value of 0.942 for a Hausman specifi cation test 
(Hausman and Taylor, 1981) accepts the null hypothesis that real spending on highways/bridges, 
real spending on public transportation, and road density are correlated with individual effects but 
not with observation errors.
In general, the estimation results in Column (d) are robust. GDP per capita and vehicle use cost 
index have positive and negative impacts, respectively, on vehicle consumption. Interestingly, the 
point estimates in absolute value are essentially suggesting that a 1% increase in GDP per capita 
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and in the use cost index will have offsetting effects on provincial vehicle consumption per 1,000 
persons. Wage rate has an expected positive sign but is not signifi cant at any reasonable level of 
signifi cance.
Infrastructure spending and road density variables again have their expected signs and are not 
signifi cant at a 0.10 (or smaller) level. However, relative to IV-Lagged model, spending on public 
transit is less signifi cant (0.30 level on a two tail test), whereas highway infrastructure investment is 
signifi cant at a 0.11 level (two-tail test). Percent urban has a similar impact on vehicle consumption 
and the effect of population density is much lower in absolute value (-1.306 vs. -0.662). Also robust 
is the impact of vehicle limitation in the Hausman-Taylor specifi cation, indicating that the effect of 
these policies reduces provincial vehicle consumption per 1,000 by 35%.11
Highest Urbanization Provinces
In order to gain more insight on the variation in private vehicle ownership among the provinces, 
Table 7 reports separate Hausman-Taylor estimates for the highest (> 60%) and less urbanized
(< 60%) provinces, as identifi ed in Table 7.12 Overall, each model fi ts the data well. Importantly, the 
estimation results identify the oftentimes large differential impacts that determining factors have on 
provincial vehicle private vehicle consumption.
Whereas private vehicle ownership grows a bit more than proportionately than GDP per capita 
in all of China’s provinces, there is a strong disproportionate relationship in the highest urbanized 
provinces. In particular, a 1% increase in provincial GDP per capita more than doubles private 
vehicle ownership, 1.67% in the highest urbanized provinces compared with a 0.69% for the less 
urbanized provinces. Although not as dramatic as GDP per capita, the other economic variables also 
have larger coeffi cients (in absolute value) in the highest urbanized provinces. The one possible 
exception is the wage rate. The hypothesis was that an increase in the wage rate would increase 
private vehicle ownership, holding GDP per capita constant, since higher wages refl ect higher 
values of time. The results for each group of provinces produced a positive sign, as expected, but 
are statistically insignifi cant in each case. The largest cities in China (e.g., Shanghai and Beijing) 
have signifi cant congestion delays, more uniform spatial development in contrast to the hub and 
spoke networks in the West, and a large public transportation infrastructure. The net effect of these 
factors may be that the travel time advantage of privately owned vehicles relative to alternative 
means of travel is not signifi cant.
The infrastructure variables for the highest urbanized provinces are uniformly stronger in their 
effects, carry their expected signs, and are statistically signifi cant. Real investment in highway 
infrastructure and in road density increase, as expected, private vehicle ownership. Further, real 
investments in public transportation have their expected impacts, decreasing private vehicle 
ownership.
Characteristics in the spatial environment between the two groups also affect private vehicle 
demands differently, all else being constant. The extent of urbanization has nearly twice the impact 
on vehicle consumption in the highest urbanized provinces. At the same time, a 1% increase in 
population density reduces per-capita private vehicle ownership by 0.67% in the most urbanized 
areas. This compares with a much weaker 0.13% (0.13 p-value, not reported) impact in the less 
urbanized areas.
Increases in vehicle use cost signifi cantly decrease private vehicle consumption in less urbanized 
areas but have a much weaker (and statistically insignifi cant effect in a two-tail test) in the most 
urbanized areas. Vehicle ownership and use restrictions have little statistical effect, in contrast to 
the much stronger results in Table 6. This may refl ect separate explanations for each group. In the 
less urbanized areas, the absence of a signifi cant effect likely refl ects the lack of variation since only 
one province implemented a vehicle restriction during the sample period. For the highest urbanized 
areas, the sign on the vehicle limitation is consistent with expectations, but the p-value is much 
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lower 0.19. This group comprises only 84 observations, and the loss in degrees of freedom reduces 
the precision of the estimate. 
Table 7: Hausman-Taylor Estimates by Level of Urbanization
Dependent Variable Private Vehicle Ownership Per 1,000 Persons
< 60% Urbanized ≥ 60% Urbanization
Estimate s.e. Estimate s.e.
Explanatory Variables Economic Environment
GDP Per Capita 0.696*** 0.192 1.670*** 0.278
Wage Rate 0.140 0.123 0.216 0.251
Vehicle Use Cost Index -1.102*** 0.484 -0.458*** 0.478
Infrastructure
Highway Investments 0.012 0.019 0.053* 0.029
Public Transit Investments -0.0002 0.008 -0.043*** 0.014
Road Density 0.028 0.049 0.631*** 0.153
Spatial Environment
Percent Urban 0.302* 0.162 0.529*** 0.155
Population Density -0.136 0.089 -0.676*** 0.195
Regulation
Vehicle Limitation 0.226 0.184 -0.156 0.118
Other
Constant -7.378*** 2.257 -16.566*** 3.596
Adjusted R2 0.9794 0.9858
Cross Section Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 268 84
MSE 0.0139 0.0096
Adjusted R2 0.9794 0.9858
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.15, ** p<0.1, *** p<0.05
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The objective of this paper was to identify those factors that underlie China’s signifi cant growth in 
private vehicle ownership since 2000. Private vehicle consumption per 1,000 vehicles increased 
over 20% per year, with higher growth rates in the less urbanized areas and, more recently, with the 
annual growth rate falling (rising) in the more (less) urbanized areas.
The analysis developed and tested hypotheses on the impact that economic, infrastructure, 
spatial, and regulatory environments have upon private vehicle ownership across China’s provinces 
during the period 2000–2012. The Hausman-Taylor (HT) specifi cation provides the best overall fi t 
of the model, and the results are relatively robust to one-way fi xed effects and lagged instrumental 
variable models.
The HT estimates for the overall sample lead to the following conclusions. One, the model 
strongly rejects the null hypotheses that economic, spatial, and regulatory environments have no 
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effect on private vehicle ownership. Among the specifi c factors, the model did not provide reliable 
estimates for the wage rate – included as a proxy for the value of time. Also, the estimated results 
give a private vehicle demand elasticity (-1.041) for vehicle use costs that equal the income (GDP 
per capita) elasticity of demand (-0.996). This suggests that (e.g., tax) policies intended to increase 
a private vehicle’s operating cost could be an effective tool to offset increases in GDP per capita. 
However, separate model estimates by level of urbanization argue against this, as discussed below.
Two, and contrary to expectations, the sample results accept the null hypothesis that infrastructure 
investments and road density have no impact on private vehicle provincial demands. Although these 
variables have the expected signs, at standard levels of signifi cance the results do not reject the null 
hypothesis. When disaggregated by level of urbanization and separately estimated, model results 
shed additional light on the differential role of infrastructure spending. 
Third, non-economic factors that drive private vehicle ownership in high urbanization provinces 
are not drivers of private vehicle ownership in less urbanized provinces. The general result is that 
for the most urbanized provinces, economic, infrastructure, spatial, and regulatory environments 
all drive private vehicle ownership decisions. But there are important differences from the results 
for the total sample. Per-capita GDP has a much stronger positive impact on vehicle ownership 
with a much larger 1.67 elasticity estimate. By comparison, the GDP per-capita elasticity for less 
urbanized areas is 0.70. Also, the results indicate that for high urbanized areas, increases in use cost 
have negative but unreliably estimated effects on private vehicle demands; increases in vehicle use 
cost have larger effects on demands than increases in GDP per capita. This accords with inferences 
that one could draw from the descriptive statistics in Table 5, where highly urbanized provinces 
have much higher GDP per capita, vehicle ownership rates, wages, and infrastructure investments. 
The most important difference from the results for the full sample relates to infrastructure 
spending where highway and public transit investments have the expected positive and negative 
impacts, respectively, on provincial vehicle demands in the most urbanized provinces. Also 
consistent with expectations is a strong positive impact on private vehicle demands with increases 
in road density. Although on a two-tail test, the impact of vehicle limitation policies for the most 
urbanized areas is statistically insignifi cant, the model rejects the null hypothesis of no impact at a 
.10 level using a one-tail test.
Fourth, the disaggregated results for the lower urbanized provinces, although based on a sample 
three times as large, are much weaker. For these provinces, the model rejects the null hypothesis 
that economic factors have no effect on private vehicle demands where consumer demands are more 
sensitive to the use cost than to increases in GDP per capita. The spatial environment continues to 
be important but with weaker impacts on demands.13 
A broad implication from these results relates to the set of factors that affect private vehicle 
demands as provinces become more urbanized. In less urbanized provinces, economic factors and, 
specifi cally, income and vehicle-related costs are primary drivers of private vehicle demands. As 
less urbanized provinces transition into areas with higher rates of urbanization, the fi ndings in this 
study indicate that in addition to economic factors, infrastructure, spatial, and regulatory factors are 
important in shaping a province’s private vehicle demands.
Areas for future research are numerous, many of which are additional robustness checks. 
Examples include: 1) updating the panel data while searching for better testing alternative instrumental 
variables; 2) analyzing private vehicle demands for smaller geographical units (e.g., city level) or 
from household survey data; 3) estimating the impacts of specifi c vehicle restrictions; 4) applying 
alternative estimation methodologies (e.g., dynamic models); 5) developing a better understanding 
of the roles that highway investments and alternative forms of public transit investments have on 
vehicle ownership; and 6) determining the consequences of these results for congestion, air quality 
and health, and highway safety.
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Endnotes
1. A Gompertz function is a sigmoid function and a special case of the generalized logistic function 
that has a different position for the infl ection point.
2. Since the model controls for per-capita GDP, average wage is expected to capture value of 
time more than income. Since the income effect and the value of time effect of average wage 
is expected to increase private vehicle consumption, there is an upward bias on the effect of 
average wage. The magnitude of the bias depends on the extent to which average wage is a good 
proxy for value of time.
3. Increases in population density also affect other highway modes (e.g., bus travel) and the 
relative effect could be a net shift from private vehicle to public transit. This analysis focuses 
on the demand for private vehicles rather than the share of private vehicles in the modal mix.
4. National Bureau of Statistics, China (http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/) and EPS China 
Data (http://edp.epsnet.com.cn/database_en.html). China’s administrative structure includes 
three levels: provincial, autonomous regions, and municipalities. Provinces and autonomous 
regions are sub-divided into prefectures, counties, and cities. And counties are sub-divided into 
townships. Municipalities are city-provinces (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin) that the 
Central Government directly controls. This analysis includes the China’s 22 provinces, fi ve 
autonomous regions, and four municipalities.( http://www.china.org.cn/english/kuaixun/64784.
htm).
5. Because there is no consumer price index (CPI) for transportation for Tibet, we use Xinjiang’s 
CPI for transportation as a proxy since Tibet and Xinjiang provinces have similar economic 
environments. Also, in preliminary models, we created a proxy for vehicle price based on tax 
revenues from vehicle purchases, the vehicle tax rate, and changes in private vehicles from one 
year to the next. Except for some new energy vehicles, almost all vehicles are taxed. Because 
the variable consistently led to poorer results and perverse signs, we excluded the variable from 
the fi nal versions. Part of the reason this was a poor proxy is that data on vehicle purchase taxes 
include public transit in addition to private vehicles.
6. Wang (2016, p. 31-36) reports the details of these policies, particularly for Shanghai and Beijing.
7. Rejecting the random effects model rejects the null that the error term and the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated. Standard errors in these models are heteroskedastic/autocorrelation 
consistent.
8. For instance, there may be higher vehicle consumption than expected, given the urbanization 
rate. Excluding from the equation vehicle purchase credit policies will bias upward the 
coeffi cient of the urbanization variable if more lenient credit policies are expected to have a 
larger effect on urban relative to rural populations. Systematic measurement errors also produce 
inconsistent estimates.
9. We explored a number of instruments outside those included in the model. The most promising 
was road lamps. When governments invest money on roads and bridges, they also build road 
lamps on the roadsides. So the number of road lamps is expected to be highly correlated with 
investments on roads and bridges but uncorrelated with the error term. Preliminary analyses 
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found that the model fi ts with this instrument were inferior to those reported in Columns (c) 
and (d) in Table 6.
10. Consistent with IV-Lagged specifi cation, GDP per capita and vehicle use cost are lagged one 
period. Wage rate, percent urban, and population density are unlagged.
11. Hausman and Taylor (1981) assume that the means of the regressors are uncorrelated with the 
individual effects. If the regressors rather than their means are uncorrelated with the individual 
effects, Amemiya-MaCurdy (1986) demonstrate that this leads to more effi cient instruments. 
For this analysis, the Amemiya-MaCurdy (1986) estimates differ very little from the reported 
estimates in Column (d) of Table 6. SAS/ETS 14.1 User’s Guide, Panel Procedure Details. 
Copyright © 2002-2012 SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA.
12. There was not suffi cient variation in the vehicle limitation policies to estimate separate models 
for provinces whose urbanization was less than or equal to 50%, between 50% to 60%, and 
60% or more.
13. On a one-tail test, population density is signifi cant at a 0.10 level of signifi cance.
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